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Boundedly Rational Consumers: 





Recent Challenges to Antitrust  
University of Haifa Faculty of Law 
May 8-9, 2014 




1. The prediction challenge 
 2. The efficiency challenge 
  3. The welfare challenge 
The Prediction Challenge 
 
Inaccurate prediction /      
   evaluation 
    
         
 
         Erroneous rules /  
         enforcement practices 
 




 Competition        Efficiency 




Competition        Social welfare 
The Prediction Challenge 
• Familiar… 
• Primarily relevant for consumer-directed 
aspects of market power 
– Aftermarkets 
– Bundling, tying, and rebate schemes 
– Unilateral effects market definition 
• Doctrine / enforcement practices can 
accommodate 
 
The Efficiency Challenge 
• Substantial & unsurprising empirical evidence 
of consumer mistakes 
– From both lab and field 
– Not universal, but not uncommon 
• Basic model: distorted demand, misallocation 
– Even under perfect competition 
• More advanced models in “behavioral industrial 
organization” over the recent decade – what 
happens when producers react to consumers’ 
bounded rationality? 
– Sometimes the presence of BR consumers can 
improve competitive outcomes compared to a 
market populated only by rational consumers 
• E.g., “reciprocal” consumers give experience products a 
chance but avoid if fail, while rational consumers realize 
producers prefer low quality and avoid the market 
altogether    (Huck & Tyran, 2007) 
– Usually, inefficiencies remain, even under perfect 
competition 
 
• Occasionally, increased competition can even reduce 
efficiency (compared to diminished competition or 
direct regulation) 
– Intuitive example: credence goods, when consumers rely 
on casual stories and cannot distinguish between skill and 
luck (e.g., alternative medicine, mutual funds) 
» competition tends to drive price down 
» but an increased number of providers increases 
likelihood of erroneous, anecdote-based attribution 
» Inefficiencies remain even if some providers offer a 
quality service 
» Firms respond to competitive pressure by creating 
artificial product differentiation     
              (Spiegler, 2006) 
• More generally, sellers react strategically in order to exploit, 
even facilitate consumer error  
– Exploit underestimation of future demand by low (even 
free or a negative cost) upfront fees and high per-use fees 
later  (e.g., credit card features) 
– Exploit overestimation of future demand by high 
upfront/low per-use fees or larger bundles (e.g., gym 
membership) 
» competition to attract biased consumers ex-ante is beneficial, 
lowering prices of focal service / product  
» In both cases, inefficiencies remain under competition 
– Facilitate consumer error—complex price schemes for 
products, with increased competition leading to a 
proliferation of artificially differentiated price schemes 
 
 
Hence the efficiency challenge… 
Competition, Judgment, and Efficiency 
• Even a less-than-perfect relationship between 
competition and efficiency still offers 
meaningful guidance to antitrust law 
– Some product markets still approximate standard 
model 
– Heterogeneity in rationality can reduce effects of 
bias, particularly where learning / incentives to 
educate consumers exist 
 
• The important question is comparative: how 
more competition compares to 
 less competition (fewer firms with more 
power)  --- or --- more regulation… 
• Both alternatives usually do worse the competition 
• Particularly  regulation with its many familiar shortcomings 
• Note also that regulation is often present already as a 
potentially complementary regime in many of the affected 
markets 
– Professional services involving credence goods, 
telecommunications, banking and finance, and so on 
– But usually with a focus that is very different from consumer BR 
concerns   
 
Competition and Consumer Choice 
• The behavioral IO literature examines effects on 
market outcomes , studying the impact of 
phenomena relating to reference-dependent DM 
    (framing effects, loss aversion, status quo bias, etc.) 
– Loss aversion (LA), for instance, tends to magnify 
perceived differences among substitutes in both 
price and product features 
– Can either soften competition (e.g. moving to a 
product with inferior fit/features) or intensify it (e.g. 
moving from a less to a more expensive product), 




 . . . but treats “nonstandard” 
preferences as given  
The Welfare Challenge 
(which remains even if consumers make no errors 
of judgment, yet manifest constructed choices) 
• Extensive evidence of constructed choice 
– Expressions of preferences are generally constructed 
at the time of valuation / choice 
– Construction process shaped by interaction bw/ 
person and task characteristics 
         =  Highly contingent decision behavior  
• Applied and extended by consumer research 
Which is why constructed preferences 
challenge the competition-welfare link… 
Competition, Choice, and Welfare 
• Even a less-than-perfect relationship between 
competition and welfare still offers 
meaningful justification for antitrust law 
– Substantial fraction of inherent preferences 
– Some preference stabilize over time  
– Even constructed preferences often not wholly 
divorced from higher-order, “true” preferences 
– Most importantly, again, this is a comparative 
question  
• less competition  and choice / regulation of preferences 
much worse  
